

IS. I-12-57 (OB)

DA INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Use this form only in accordance with instructions in SR 580-305-5)		CONFIDENTIAL		COUNTRY REPORTED ON GDR	DATE OF REPORT 30 Jan 58
SUBJECT Tank Regt 1, BURG, and Tank Tactics in					
SUMMARY GDR EGA Downgrading data cannot be predetermined 50X1-HUM					
Of Information: This report contains information on Tk Regt 1, BURG, and describes Division training maneuvers held in the area of KLIETZ in Oct 56. 50X1-HUM					
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Tank Regt 1, BURG, and Tank Tactics in EGA

REPORT

A. Tank Regiment 1, BURG See OB Summary (Incl L) and TC/E charts (Incl 2 & 3)

Note that the 1st Bn has 3 companies, while the 2d and 3d Bn have two Co's each

B. Training for Maneuvers

1. Alerts

The continuous sounding of a siren for a prolonged period of time will indicate an alert. All personnel will at once proceed to their assigned tanks and vehicles, while Bn COs will report to the Regt CO for orders. It is general practice to have all alerts at night whether they are test alerts or combat alerts. In a combat alert all tanks and vehicles will be prepared for action within 90 minutes and the 1/Sgt of each company with a small detail and one truck will proceed to the ammunition depot to load the required ammunition. Bn COs report to Regt'l CO that battalions are ready to move, and are subsequently informed by the Regt'l CO of route of march to the concentration area, which was generally located in a wooded terrain a distance of 20 km E of BURG (no pinpoint location). Upon arrival, assigned positions are taken up by the units and security measures are initiated to protect the area from any surprise attacks.

2. Concentration Area in Maneuvers

Large scale maneuvers, in which all units of the 1st Mtz Rif Div (PCTSDAM) participated, began in early Oct 56 in the area of KLIETZ (UTM 33UUU 0239). Source's unit, Tk Regt 1, was assigned a concentration area located approximately 20 km from the first enemy trench. When the concentration area had been extensively reconnoitered, all units of the Tk Regt 1 moved into the concentration area and the Mtz Rif Co of the Regt was assigned guard duty to secure the area.

3. Commanders' Reconnaissance

The Regt'l CO and his staff now move in an APC, protected by another APC manned by 15 men, forward in the direction of the first enemy line to conduct a survey of the forward area in order to determine a position from which the best view of the enemy terrain can be obtained. Upon arriving at a point affording a good survey of the enemy positions, the Regt'l CO and his group now start the reconnaissance of the enemy area accompanied by the COs of other divisional infantry units who occupy the front trenches.

After the reconnaissance, the Regt'l CO then explains to the Bn COs (a) their individual mission; (b) assigns the specific attack sectors; (c) gives instructions as to the direction of the attack; (d) and designates the Bn (Fuehrungsbattalion) which will be the spearhead unit in the attack. Particular consideration is placed on operations on the unit boundary in an effort to facilitate cooperation and coordination with adjacent units.

4. Mission

The Regt'l CO emphasized to his group the particular mission of the tank and infantry units in the offensive, consisting of the following major points; close coordination and cooperation between tanks and infantry, annihilation of enemy forces and weapons, destruction of all enemy positions including the third trench, repulsion of possible counter attacks, advance into the enemy's depth and

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taking up pursuit of withdrawing enemy forces.

Additional information and instructions given by the Regt'l CO to his command group are as follows: The exact time of proceeding to the jump-off position and time of attack; the maximum distance which the enemy will be pursued; the location of a specific area at which damaged and disabled tanks and other vehicles will be concentrated; the location of a field aid station; the location of the Regt'l CP during the attack; the location of the rendezvous area of the Regt after the attack; the operational frequency and the auxiliary frequency assigned to tank radio communication system; the location of a specific area used by the chemical units of the Regt for the de-contamination of tanks, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment subjected to radioactive contamination from dust and fallout following the explosion of an atomic warhead.

Until five minutes prior to the commencement of the attack, there will be complete radio silence. Information is further given on specific radio signals for imminent enemy tank (333), gas (666), or air attacks (999). These numbers sometimes vary from (1 to 9), and are generally assigned by the CO of the Div. In radio communications, code names (mostly fruit names) are used for points of elevation. Bn COs inform their Co COs who in turn pass the information on to platoon leaders.

5. Platoon Reconnaissance

Each company commander points out to his three platoon leaders the sector of attack assigned to them, and designates three orientation points (CP 1 to 3), while reiterating the specific mission of the Regt. Together with his tank driver and gunner and the two other tank commanders the platoon leader (himself a tank commander) now conducts reconnaissance on foot in their particular assigned area. They consult with infantry units in the front line to obtain information on the enemy situation.

6. Preparation for Attack

At the time assigned for movement to the jump-off position, tanks and infantry units proceed to occupy the jump-off position. Shortly prior to or at the commencement of the movement from the concentration area, artillery preparation fire is laid down from the concentration area or another assigned area in the vicinity in an effort to camouflage the noise of the rolling tanks and vehicles and in order to harass the enemy positions. Preparation fire will generally be directed to an assigned enemy area for a predetermined time, or may last as long as friendly tanks have not yet reached the first enemy trench, after which it may be gradually shifted to the enemy rear and then perhaps to an area as far as guns will reach.

7. The Attack

At the predetermined time, tanks and infantry in carriers leave the jump-off position and advance toward the first enemy trench. Upon reaching the enemy, the infantry units dismount and deploy over the entire width of the attack sector. The tanks move on over the area of 200 m between the first and the second enemy trench, where they meet heavier resistance from the enemy. During the initial attack on the first enemy trench, different variations of attack are possible according to facts and circumstances present. If losses were heavy during the advance from the jump-off position to the first trench, advancing infantry units will be relieved by infantry units of the division entrenched in forward positions. The main consideration is given to the necessity to have fresh infantry troops carry the attack without interruption to the first and second enemy trenches in close contact and cooperation with the tanks. (In this connection Source mentioned, that it is a principle to carry out an attack only if the attacker has a superiority of three to one in men and material) when the first position of the enemy is taken, the pursuit of the enemy to the second position is carried out. Infantry will either ride on tanks or follow tanks closely either in platoon or company columns.

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The entire division and its regiments are given their daily missions, and the fulfillment of the daily mission by each unit is paramount. If the first echelon had high losses, the second echelon will take over and either continue the attack or at least will hold on to the position in accordance with the fulfillment of the daily mission.

C. Training Under Simulated Atomic Conditions:**1. Special Instruction Courses:**

In Dec 55, CBR instructors were assigned to participate in a special training course at the Officers' College in DRESDEN, which lasted for three months from Dec 55 to Feb 56. The course consisted of instructions and training in protective measures in the event of atomic warfare. Upon the return of the graduated CBR instructors, chemical squads were formed in each battalion, and were thoroughly trained in specific courses under conditions of atomic warfare. For this purpose, special protective suits with protective overshoes, elbow-length gloves, and a protective mask with canister and carrier were issued to all personnel of chemical squads.

This training included protection against radioactive fallout and contaminated ground, equipment and protective clothing of troops when engaging in decontamination. Training aids in the form of large-sized, multi-colored posters on cardboard, special instruction manuals (DV-52-5), rods and yellow flags bearing a skull in black for the marking of contaminated areas, and Geiger counters were used in instruction and training of chemical squads.

Training officers of the Regt participated in these special courses in order to disseminate their newly gained knowledge on protective measures in atomic warfare to all other units of the Regt. Troops were issued special protective capes, separate protective boots worn as overshoes, and a plastic mat to lie on in contaminated areas, in addition to the ordinary gas mask belonging to the equipment issue.

Once a month, practical field training took place for two hours during which theoretical knowledge gained in training courses was to be proven in practice.

In Spring 1956, Source and two other officers of his Regt were assigned to participate in a conference of ECA officers held at PRORA on Ruegen island, during which they witnessed training exercises of another tank regiment, and were shown five or six Soviet films depicting maneuvers of Soviet troops in the USSR. The films included scenes demonstrating the explosion of an atomic warhead, the forming of the mushroom-like cloud and the following attack supported by all types of units by-passing the contaminated area.

2. Tank Techniques and Tactics under Atomic Conditions:

All training exercises under simulated atomic conditions were carried out under the presumption that the enemy would attack with tactical atomic weapons such as shells or small-type rockets with atomic warheads instead of an atom bomb.

Tank commanders were instructed to keep tanks at distances of at least 150m from each other in contrast to the conventional spacing of 50m. By these precautionary methods of operation, it is hoped to minimize the effects of an atomic explosion. Only when combat contact with the enemy is finally established will tanks and accompanying infantry units be permitted to deploy again in the conventional manner. It is taught that in case the enemy uses atomic weapons, one battalion may be wiped out by an atomic strike.

In a defensive position, and whenever an atomic attack is anticipated, standing orders are to dig in immediately. Food, fuel, oil supplies and similar items are stored in underground shelters. Tanks are placed in special tank trenches dug to a depth of approximately 2.60m, which are supposedly considered blast proof, and are camouflaged effectively. All other motor vehicles are placed in trenches covered with camouflage netting.

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In the offensive, tanks are considered to afford sufficient protection to crew members against radioactive fallout. After a thorough decontamination by members of the chemical squad at a specified place, they will be in operational condition again. However, other units operating in the combat area and lacking the protection of armor, will take immediate cover upon the explosion of an atomic warhead. They will lie prone on the ground, take advantage of all terrain elevations and will put their protective capes over themselves and their equipment. They will remain under cover until the chemical squads have determined by means of their Geiger counters that radioactive dust has ceased to fall.

At that time, or in the event that an attack is ordered, every soldier throws his protective cape off, taking good care and every precaution not to come into contact with its outer surface which is by now badly contaminated by fallout. The protective cape is left behind and will be collected by the chemical squad for decontamination at a later time, if feasible. The attack is now continued and each soldier, while carrying his weapon in the right hand, holds a plastic mat rolled up in his left, which he unrolls and lies flat on it in case of any emergency. The mat protects the soldier from the contaminated ground and is always carried by him in an unrolled position while he advances. The upper surface of the mat on which the soldier has to lie to avoid contact with the contaminated ground and the outer surface, is marked by two red stripes to preclude any confusion with the contaminated side. The rectangle-sized mat is held in shape by wooden slats fastened to each of its small sides. The size of the mat is approximately 1.40 x 0.70m, and it has a thickness of 1 1/2 to 2mm.

Any surviving platoon leader first noticing the explosion of an atomic warhead will fire a signal flare at once displaying a red cluster of stars as a warning of an atomic explosion, as a result of which all aforementioned precautionary measures are taken.

Contaminated areas are immediately marked by the chemical units in the following manner: Iron rods, 6mm in diameter and 1.20m long are placed into the ground at distances of 15 to 20m, which are connected by one strand of 2cm wide yellow ribbon, thus surrounding the area of radioactivity. At the top of the rod, a triangular flag of yellow plastic material showing a skull in black is clamped on. In case of areas with brush and other obstacles, another 1.20m long rod is clamped to the first rod as an extension, and a second like flag is displayed at its end. In instances where the presence of gas only renders the area inaccessible plain yellow flags and a red ribbon are used.

Passages through the contaminated areas, which were previously rendered safe by decontamination, consisting in the removal of the top soil infiltrated with fallout, or by being covered with wooden planks or mats, are specifically marked in the same manner as described above, except that rods will not be connected by any ribbon. Safe passages through contaminated areas are generally 15-m-wide and guards from the chemical platoon are posted at the entrances to direct troops and vehicles.

3. Offensive with Simulated Atomic Weapons:

In training it is assumed that an offensive will be supported by the use of simulated atomic weapons in the form of shells or small-type, short-range rockets with atomic warheads. Such shells and rockets are not in actual use in EGA units, and Source does not believe that they are stored in EGA ammunition or other depots. Source has no specific knowledge whether such weapons are in the possession of Soviet units in the GDR. Source states that self-propelled artillery pieces were supposed to have fired the simulated shells with the atomic warhead, while simulated rockets were supposedly launched from trucks of the rocket-launching type. Fire with these weapons was directed at the second position of the enemy which was supposed to be located approximately 7 km to the rear of the first position. This distance was deemed necessary to preclude any damage or danger to the own forces.

The places of impact of atomic warhead will be communicated to all friendly troop units in maneuver area, who will be instructed not to enter any contaminated regions but to carry out their attacks by-passing such areas if possible.

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In most cases the first atomic warhead will be fired together with every preparation in an effort to destroy the second position of the enemy and thus to relieve friendly units in the following attack. Prevailing weather conditions are considered of major importance in determining the employment of atomic warheads in an offensive action. In the event that the direction of prevailing winds would possibly endanger friendly units, by radioactive fallout, atomic warheads would not be employed.

All training maneuvers of the EGA are carried out under war-like conditions, and Source believes that it is reasonable to assume that no major tactical changes will become effective in an emergency. the employment of 50X1-HUM troop units and formations will remain and be practiced in the same manner as combat training has been carried out since 1956.

4. Tank Tactics in Defense:

In a defensive situation, the tank can be utilized in effective operations in the following methods: a) as an immobile artillery piece, located in a secure tank trench; b) as mobile artillery with two or three alternate positions constructed as tank trenches, which the tank backs out of to fire, and after firing, shifts over to another tank trench; c) as a tank in ambush with the mission to permit enemy tanks to advance and then fire on the enemy from ambush; d) to be used in initiating a counter-attack from a defense position. In a tactical withdrawal, a tank platoon, in cooperation with artillery and infantry, will cover the withdrawal of a battalion.

5. Amphibian Tanks:

The amphibian tank platoon in Tk Regt I is under the direct control of the Regt'l CO, and is not subordinate to the reconnaissance company. However, upon special orders issued by the Regt'l CO, amphibian tanks are used for reconnaissance purposes or for action in such mission precluding the employment of ordinary tanks due to the presence of sizeable lakes or other water obstructions.

D. Firing Practice:

1. With 85mm gun on T-34:

In Sep 56, firing practice was conducted in HILLERSLEESEN near MAGDEBURG, where special firing ranges for tanks are located. The following methods of firing the gun were practiced: 2) From a tank in motion on a stationary target; b) from a tank halting for 6 to 8 seconds at a target in motion; c) from a stationary tank on stationary and moving targets; d) and night firing practice on illuminated and non-illuminated targets. Firing accuracy was only 60 to 65 % when firing the T-34 85mm gun from a brief halt.

2. With 100 mm Gun on T-54:

When [] unit had completed their firing practice, the and 50X1-HUM number of co-officers of his unit asked and received permission from two Soviet officers they knew to have firing practice with the 100mm gun and with the driver's machine gun installed on a T-54. [] permitted to fire three 100mm rounds from a moving T-54 at a moving target of 5 mm thick armor-plate in the form of a tank silhouette at a range of approximately 1,100 m.

[] estimated the firing accuracy at 80% and were of the unanimous opinion that the gun was very reliable and accurate. Source was told that the gun was equipped with a stabilizer which [] was located underneath a large metal cover housing forward of the breech block and under the gun tube. a range finder device indicated ranges from 400 to 5,000 m from which [] the firing range to be a maximum of 5,000 m.

Other specifications of the gun as [] by Soviet Officers are as follows:

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<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Caliber100 mm</td> <td>Recoil limits.....40cm (estimated)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Lands and grooves.....32</td> <td>Breech block.....drop-wedge, semi-automatic</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Muzzle brake.....6 elongated slits</td> <td>Type of recoil .. Hydropneumatic</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Muzzle velocity...high explosive 970 mps; armor-piercing 1050 mps; high-velocity, armor-piercing 1200 mps.</td> </tr> </table>			Caliber100 mm	Recoil limits.....40cm (estimated)	Lands and grooves.....32	Breech block.....drop-wedge, semi-automatic	Muzzle brake.....6 elongated slits	Type of recoil .. Hydropneumatic	Muzzle velocity...high explosive 970 mps; armor-piercing 1050 mps; high-velocity, armor-piercing 1200 mps.	
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50X1-HUM

4. Data of Tank T-54:

Fuel capacity of tank is 680 liters including a reserve tank with 100 liters; oil capacity is said to be 100 liters, water capacity is estimated at 100 liters. With full fuel tanks, the T-54 is said to be able to operate within a radius of 160 km.

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1Incl 1ORDER OF BATTLE SUMMARY

1st DESS: TANK: Tank Regt 1, BURG

SUPERVISOR: 1st Mtz wif Div,
POTSDAM

FUEL: 1000: 1000

CASE: Name: Panzer Dienststelle 1
Coord: waldfrieden
BURG I (JTL 32UPC9595)
Actual and Organizational

REF: 1437

KEY: 1000: 1000

STRENGTH: 112 OFF

CO, Col SCHLINSKI

102 MCC's & 661 FFI

Deputy, Maj JUNG

15 CIV

Polit Dep, Capt KUELLER

Total Strength 890

G of S, Maj KAPPES

REF:

ART:

Infantry: 3x SMV

Mort: 3 x 82mm Mortar M1941

18x Zis-150

Trucks: 3x Zis-151

13x Gaz-51

Guns:

Mortals: 5x Gaz-67B; 9x GAX-63

8x H3A w/trailer

Other: 3x Tank trucks G-5 w/trailer tank

3x staff bus G-5

6x workshop trucks G-5; 5x battery

trucks Zis-150

AR: 3x phenomen ambulances; 1x oil Gun/How:

and water heating truck Zis-150

T: 19 x motorcycles M-72 with sidecars

55x T-34/85mm

AT Guns: 9 x 45mm AT Gun M 1942

AC: 5x JS-2

3x amphibian T-34/76mm

5x SF Gun 85mm M-1943

AA Guns:

5x APC BTR-152

3x armored Car Ba-64

Other: 3 x 12.7mm HMG DSHK 1938

without wheels, mounted by
tripod on Gaz-63UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS & EQUIP:SMALL ARMS:

22 x 7.62 LMG "DEP" mounted on sidecars and APC's

(19 mounted on sidecars, 3 mounted on APC BTR-152)

UNIT HISTORY: 3 x 7.62mm DP LMG

380 x TT-33 pistols

250 x M1941 SMGs

245 x Carbines M 1944, 7.62mm

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
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
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Regt 1 (2nd Bn Identical)
 Inclosure #3
 Organization Chart


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10/E of 3rd Div, 1st Regt (1st Div)
 Inclosure #3
 Organization Chart



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
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1st Tk Regt 1

Figure #2

Organization Chart

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
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
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Pg. 1 of 1 Pg.








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
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Tk Regt 1 (2nd Bn Identical)
 Inclosure #3
 Organization Chart

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10/E of Jrd DN, 1R Regt 1 (2nd *4
 Inclosure #3
 Organization Chart



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